Gordon L. Rottman

The departure of young men and women, the most motivated and intelligent and the very future of the new socialist state, was of particular concern. This ‘brain drain’ was depleting the country of its best and brightest at a faster rate than it could train new professionals. [...]
While the DDR lost valuable human resources, their flight actually consolidated the Communist hold on the country: its strongest opponents
had left. Those who remained lived a in a society discouraging initiative and independence, and lacking in genuine political responsibility. There was little prospect of internal change; uprisings had been brutally crushed in East Berlin (1953), Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968) and the numerous internal security forces and counter-intelligence bodies exercised tight control.

Every Japanese manual from 1909 focused on the importance of offensive action to achieve victory. What the Japanese lacked in firepower and matériel was to be made up for by spiritual power, superior martial values, and total dedication to fulfilling one’s duty, even if it meant attacking a superior force with bayonets or defending a position to the death. An officer corps evolved which loathed defense and fixed fortifications. However, the Pacific War became nothing more than a series of defensive battles for the Japanese, a war of attrition that they did not have the resources to win, nor even to achieve a stalemate.

Regardless of rhetoric claiming the frontier was to defend against Western aggression, the barriers were clearly intended to imprison East Germany’s population. They had no military value, were not intended as obstacles to any imagined NATO invasion, and were not designed to slow and canalize an attacking army. It was at this time that the frontier security regime (Grenzsicherungsregime) with a 5km-wide restricted zone was established along with a 500m-wide security zone, into which only authorized persons were allowed. In May and June 1952 several thousand ‘dangerous persons’ were relocated from the restricted zone during Action Vermin (Aktion Ungesiefer). The similar Action Cornflower (Aktion Kornblume) was executed in 1961 after the Berlin Wall was erected. Some 12,000 people were relocated in both operations.

As soon as the ordnance team arrived, they made it clear that they were already well informed (meaning they’d already made up their minds) concerning our problem and had decided (without so much as a question to us) that we as a Battalion were responsible for a bad rap being given to a marvelous little rifle! The lads in the rear had decided that we were simply not keeping our rifles clean, and if we weren’t such inattentive and unmotivated “oafs” being led by incompetents, we wouldn’t have such a problem. Needless to say, the hackles stood up on the back of our necks.

It was said the M16 was designed not to kill, but only to wound. The “theory” was that a wounded soldier would require at least two men to take him off the battlefield and that this would overwhelm the enemy’s medical services with wounded as well as affect morale. It is safe to say that morale is affected a lot more when troops are killed.

The Winchester and the Colt won the West, the Enfield held an empire, the Krag brought civilization (or tried to), the Mauser attempted to dominate the world and the Garand stopped it, while the M16 black rifle, one of the defining weapons of the post-World War II era, has long been opposed by a somewhat ugly Russian contender.

The hard-used AK-47s proved superior and it was fully realized that the use of ball powder in M16s was the problem. The Army refused to admit this and rather than changing the powder decided to design a heavier recoil buffer – making the rifle accommodate inadequate ammunition rather than improving the ammunition.

One of the first engagements involving a bazooka – details are lacking – occurred when a lone soldier bearing a bazooka separated himself from his unit and approached a Vichy coastal defense fortress armed with 155mm guns. He fired a single rocket at the rear entrance and the fortress commander surrendered.

On April 12, 1862 the revolver-armed raiders stole the Chattanooga-bound train – the General – after the crew and other passengers had disembarked for breakfast. Dropping the passenger cars, the Union raiders headed north, pursued by the highly agitated and hugely determined conductor,William Fuller

Many Special Forces camps had no .50-cals, but others had up to four or more. Ours had two. One was mounted atop a 12ft “Medal of Honor tower,” so called because to climb up there during an attack virtually guaranteed you one.